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Abstract
This paper surveys the evolutionary game theoretic literature on reciprocity in
human interactions, dealing both with long-term relationships and with sporadic in-
teractions. Four basic themes, repetition, commitment, assortation, and parochialism,
appear repeatedly throughout the literature. Repetition can give rise to the evolution
of behavior that exhibits reciprocity-like features but a vast array of other behaviors
are also stable. In sporadic interactions, reciprocity can be stable if the propensity to
punish selﬁsh actions can induce opportunists to cooperate, if reciprocators themselves
behave opportunistically when they expect others to do so, or if matching is suﬃciently
assortative.
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Reciprocity is a pervasive and economically signiﬁcant phenomenon in human interactions.
The propensity of individuals to reward generosity and punish opportunism is encountered
frequently both in long-term relationships and in sporadic interactions, including brief and
anonymous interactions in experimental environments.1 Two widely replicated groups of
experiments provide striking examples. In ultimatum and alternating-oﬀer bargaining games,
the costly rejection of unfair oﬀers suggests a willingness to incur material losses to inﬂict
harm on others who are perceived as being opportunistic (Güth et al., 1982, Ochs and Roth,
1989). In trust or gift-exchange games, the tendency to incur material losses to reward others
who are perceived as being generous provides further evidence for reciprocity (Fehr et al.,
1993, Berg et al., 1995). In many cases, such behavior is in conﬂict with the twin hypotheses
of rationality and material self-interest which are the foundation of orthodox economic theory,
and raises the question of how this behavior may have emerged and persisted in evolutionary
competition with purely opportunistic or self-serving behavior.
There is now a signiﬁcant body of literature in evolutionary game theory which sheds
some light on this question. The hallmark of the evolutionary approach is the hypothesis
that in a heterogeneous population, more successful traits will survive and spread at the
expense of less successful ones. When the traits in question are transmitted genetically, the
success of a trait refers simply to the reproductive ﬁtness of its carrier. However, much of the
literature on the evolution of reciprocity treats the biological model simply as a metaphor,
interpreting the dynamics in terms of cultural transmission. Under this interpretation, traits
are transmitted through processes of imitation and learning, and traits that bring their bearer
higher material or monetary payoﬀs are replicated faster. Within this broad framework one
ﬁn d sav a r i e t yo fm o d e l sw h i c hd i ﬀer along several dimensions. Interactions may be repeated
or sporadic, matching may be random or assortative, and individuals may be endowed with
programmed behavioral strategies or may choose in a calculated manner on the basis of well-
deﬁned preferences. It is the purpose of this survey to examine, within a uniﬁed framework,
selected contributions to this literature.
The most favorable environment for the evolution of reciprocity is in repeated interac-
tions, and the prototypical model of this kind is the inﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
As is well known from the early work of Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), a ‘tit-for-tat’ strat-
egy involving conditional cooperation can be a stable outcome of an evolutionary process in
1For a recent survey of the vast and rapidly accumulating experimental literature on reciprocity, and a
discussion of the economic implications of this work, see Fehr and Gächter (2000).
2this model. However, it is also the case that very counter-intuitive and ineﬃcient outcomes
can also be stable outcomes of the same evolutionary process. The criterion of evolutionary
stability alone is an insuﬃciently sharp predictor of outcomes in repeated games. Attempts
to obtain sharper predictions have accordingly required some modiﬁcation of the benchmark
model. One such modiﬁcation is based on the idea that complexity is costly: given any
two strategies which are equally successful in the repeated interaction, the simpler one is
assumed to have an evolutionary advantage. An alternative modiﬁcation is to allow for the
possibility that there may be errors in the implementation of a strategy, leading occasionally
to an action being taken that diﬀers from that which a strategy prescribes. Each of these
approaches is successful in sharply narrowing the set of outcomes that are consistent with
evolutionary stability. Strategies involving some form of conditional cooperation emerge as
stable outcomes in these models, although in neither case does the simple and intuitively
appealing ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy survive.
When interactions are sporadic or occur over a short horizon, the conditions under which
reciprocity can be a stable outcome of an evolutionary process are more stringent. Reci-
procity can survive if interactions are suﬃciently assortative, so that opportunistic individu-
als cannot fully exploit those with a propensity for conditional cooperation. Such assortative
interaction may itself arise endogenously through a process of conscious choice, with all in-
dividuals actively seeking to avoid contact with opportunists. Alternatively, reciprocity can
survive if those with a propensity to punish opportunistic behavior can be recognized to
possess this trait. This credible commitment to retaliate induces opportunists to behave
cooperatively in interactions with reciprocators, though not in interactions with each other.
Reciprocity can also survive if some individuals behave parochially, acting altruistically when
encountering others like themselves but opportunistically or spitefully when interacting with
opportunists. Each of these explanations requires that the propensities or preferences with
which individuals are endowed are observable, at least in the probabilistic sense that truly
opportunistic types are believed to be opportunistic with greater likelihood than are non-
opportunistic types. The assumption of observability can be dropped in explanations of
reciprocity relying on commitment only at the cost of weakening the concept of stability
that is used. When observability is imperfect, the stable outcome often involves a mixture
of types, some of whom are opportunistic. This is consistent with the experimental evidence
which identiﬁes considerable behavioral heterogeneity among subjects, and the presence in
the population of some who appear to be maximizing their material self-interest.
Repetition, assortation, commitment and parochialism are four basic themes which oc-
3cur, separately or in combination, in each of the contributions surveyed below. We begin
in Section 2 with the case of reciprocity in long-term relationships. Sections 3 and 4 deal
with reciprocity in sporadic interactions. The discussion in Section 5 deals with questions
that remain open and speculates on fruitful directions for future research. In many cases
the results surveyed are discussed within the context of speciﬁc examples, instead of being
presented in their full generality. This enables us to survey a sometimes technical and spe-
cialized literature in a manner that should be accessible to a broad range of researchers across
disciplinary boundaries. The survey is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to identify
basic methodological themes and important strands in the literature on understanding the
origins and persistence of reciprocity in human interactions.
2 Reciprocity in Relationships
We begin with the case of long-term relationships in which the interaction does not have a
ﬁxed horizon. In such situations reciprocal behavior can be fully consistent with rationality
and material self-interest. However, it is typically the case that a vast array of other behaviors
are also consistent with rationality and material self-interest. This raises the question of
whether one might expect reciprocity, rather than these other behaviors, to emerge from the
process of evolutionary competition.
An example of an interaction which will be used repeatedly for illustrative purposes
below is the following version of the symmetric two-player prisoners’ dilemma. Each of two
individuals chooses (without knowledge of the other’s choice) one of two actions, ‘cooperate’
and ‘defect’. Cooperation entails a private cost α > 0 to the cooperator, and yields a beneﬁt
β > α to the other individual. Defection involves no cost and yields no beneﬁt. The following
matrix shows the material payoﬀs to the row player, given the actions taken by both players.
C D
C β − α −α
D β 0
(1)
If two self-interested individuals are matched to play this game exactly once, they can both
be predicted to defect since defection yields a higher payoﬀ regardless of the action taken by
one’s opponent. This is clearly ineﬃcient since the outcome of mutual cooperation is strictly
preferred by both players.
Suppose, instead, that the game is inﬁnitely repeated (or alternatively, that there is no
ﬁxed bound on the number of repetitions, with a given probability of termination in each
4period). A repeated game strategy for a given player speciﬁes, for each history of past play,
an action to be taken by the speciﬁed player following that history. Since there is no bound to
the number of stages in the game, such strategies can depend in complex ways on arbitrarily
long histories. We shall consider only strategies that are of ﬁnite complexity in a sense to
be made precise below.
2.1 Finite Complexity
A strategy in a repeated game is said to be ﬁnitely complex if it can be implemented by
an automaton with a ﬁnite number of states. An automaton is described by the following
four components: a set of states, an output function which indicates which action is taken
in each state, an initial state which the machine occupies at the start of the game, and
a transition function which indicates which state is reached in the next period given the
current state and the current actions of all other players. The simplest examples are the
one-state automata ‘always cooperate’ and ‘always defect’ which adhere to the same action
in each period regardless of history.
Slightly more complex is the ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy which begins by playing ‘cooperate’
and subsequently takes whichever action its opponent took in the previous period. Such a
strategy entails ‘reciprocal altruism’ in the sense of Trivers (1971). ‘Tit-for-tat’ is clearly











The diagrams depicting ﬁnitely complex strategies are to be read as follows. S1 denotes the
initial state and Si the ith state. The action to be taken in a state follows the colon after
the state. For example, S1 : C indicates cooperation in state S1. The transition function is
indicated by arrows from one state to another, each arrow being associated with the actions
of the other player that cause that particular transition. Hence ‘tit-for-tat’ prescribes a move
to state S2 after a defection by one’s opponent and a return to state S1 after cooperation by
one’s opponent.
When matched against itself or against the unconditionally cooperative strategy, both
‘tit-for-tat’ and its opponent earn β − α in each stage. When matched against the un-
conditionally defecting strategy, ‘tit-for-tat’ yields −α in the initial period (while ‘always
5defect’ yields β); in all subsequent periods both strategies yield 0. Another two-state strat-







D −→ S2 : D
Note that ‘grim’ is behaviorally indistinguishable from ‘tit-for-tat’ when matched against
a n ys t r a t e g yt h a ti sn e v e rt h eﬁrst to defect; it is also indistinguishable from ‘tit-for-tat’
when matched against ‘always defect’.
In the case of inﬁnitely repeated games, any particular path of play gives rise to a
potentially inﬁnite sequence of payoﬀs and there are several criteria on the basis of which
such payoﬀ sequences can be compared. One of these is the limit-of-the-means or limit-
average criterion, according to which each player receives the limit as T →∞of the mean
payoﬀ obtained over the ﬁrst T periods. When strategies are of ﬁnite complexity, such a
limit always exists. We shall assume that this condition of ﬁnite complexity holds, and that
the evolutionary success of a strategy depends on the limit-average payoﬀ that it yields.
Strategies such as ‘tit-for-tat’, ‘grim’ and ‘always cooperate’ yield the maximum possible
combined limit-average payoﬀ when matched against themselves. Such strategies are said to
be eﬃcient.
A central question of interest is whether or not eﬃcient strategies such as ‘tit-for-tat’ can
survive under evolutionary competition with other strategies and if so, whether such strate-
gies are the only ones to survive. In an inﬂuential attempt to address this question, Axelrod
(1984) invited a number of researchers to submit computer programs to implement behav-
ioral strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and allowed the programs to compete in
a round-robin contest in which each program was matched pairwise with the other programs
in the program population. The population composition of programs was itself modiﬁed
over time, with the population share of more successful programs rising relative to that of
less successful ones. The simple program which implements the ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy won the
contest (by having the largest population share at the end of the tournament). A second
such tournament resulted in the same winner. Partly in response to Axelrod’s simulation
results, several attempts have been made to provide an analytical basis for the claim that
eﬃcient equilibria involving reciprocity will be selected through some sort of evolutionary
process. This literature is based on a particular notion of evolutionary stability, which is
made precise below.
62.2 Evolutionary Stability
Consider a large population, the members of which are randomly matched in pairs to play the
repeated prisoners’ dilemma. In each such interaction, the expected (limit-average) payoﬀ
to each strategy present in the population is simply the weighted average of its payoﬀs
against all other strategies, with the population proportions of each strategy determining
the weights. Suppose that the population state consists largely of some ‘incumbent’ strategy
together with a small proportion of some ‘mutant’ strategy. The incumbent is said to be an
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if, for all possible mutant strategies, the incumbent earns
strictly greater payoﬀs than the mutant when the population share of the latter is suﬃciently
small. More precisely, an incumbent strategy is an ESS if, for every mutant strategy, either
(i) the mutant earns a lower payoﬀ against the incumbent than the incumbent does against
itself, or (ii) the mutant earns the same payoﬀ against the incumbent than the incumbent
does against itself and the mutant earns a lower payoﬀ against itself than the incumbent
does against the mutant (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). The interpretation of these
conditions is that a population consisting largely of some incumbent strategy can expel
any mutant strategy which appears in suﬃciently small numbers relative to the size of the
population as a whole.
It is easily seen that none of the strategies discussed above for the iterated prisoners’
dilemma is an ESS, and that, in fact, no ESS exists. The non-existence of an ESS is typical in
repeated games and more generally in games with a sequential structure.2 This suggests the
following weakening of the evolutionary stability concept. Given some incumbent strategy,
we say that a mutant can invade if (i) either the mutant does better against the incumbent
than the incumbent does against itself, or (ii) the mutant does as well against the incumbent
as the incumbent does against itself, but better against itself than the incumbent does against
it. A strategy that cannot be invaded is a neutrally stable strategy or NSS (Maynard Smith,
1982). Note that a population consisting of a neutrally stable strategy does not necessarily
expel all rare mutants; in general there will be certain mutants that can survive (without
spreading or shrinking) within the incumbent population.3
2This problem arises because any candidate ESS in a game with a sequential structure will typically be
behaviorally indistinguishable from at least one mutant strategy in populations consisting only of these two
strategies. For example, ‘tit-for-tat’ is behaviorally indistinguishable from ‘always cooperate’ in populations
consisting only of these two strategies. In this case the mutant cannot be expelled since its payoﬀ is identical
to that of the incumbent.
3Note that all evolutionarily stable strategies are also neutrally stable, and that all neutrally stable
strategies are Nash equilibria of the (stage) game. Hence the ESS and NSS criteria can be interpreted as
7Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) showed that the strategy of perpetual defection could
be invaded by a ‘tit-for-tat’ mutant under the limit average criterion and was therefore
not neutrally stable; they also showed that ‘tit-for-tat’ is itself neutrally stable. This has
been interpreted as theoretical support for the hypothesis that cooperation sustained by
reciprocity is an inevitable outcome of the evolutionary process. It turns out, however, that
there are a vast number of strategies that are also neutrally stable, including some which
prescribe defection in almost every period. Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) give the following
example of a strategy which is neutrally stable for any positive integer k:c o o p e r a t ei na n y
period which is a multiple of k a n dd e f e c ti na l lo t h e rp e r i o d s ,p r o v i d e dt h a tp a s tp l a yh a s
conformed to this pattern; otherwise defect in all periods. For k =1this strategy sustains
complete cooperation when matched against itself. As k gets large, the strategy approaches
one of perpetual defection. The strategy is ﬁnitely complex for any k and can be represented
by the following k +1state automaton.




D −→ ... Sk−1 : D
D −→ Sk : C
D −→ Sk+1 : D
&C ↓C %
−→ ... −→ −→ −→ −→
(2)
This example illustrates that while reciprocity can indeed be an outcome of an evolutionary
selection process it is by no means an inevitable outcome. Outcomes which approximate the
worst-case scenario of perpetual defection can also be stable, as can a vast array of outcomes
between these two extremes.4 The criterion of neutral stability therefore rules out perpetual
defection but very little else in repeated interactions. Coupled with either the presence of
complexity costs or the possibility of mistakes in strategy implementation, however, neutral
reﬁnements of the static concept of Nash equilibrium. They also have a dynamic interpretation. If the
growth rate of each strategy’s population share is proportional to it’s payoﬀ (the replicator dynamics), an
NSS corresponds to a stable rest point of the dynamics, while an ESS is an asymptotically stable rest point.
(Roughly speaking, stability of a rest point means that trajectories originating nearby do not move away,
while asymptotic stability imposes the further condition that trajectories originating near the rest point
converge to it.) There may, however, exist asymptotically stable rest points of the dynamics that are not
evolutionarily stable strategies; an example based on Rosenthal (1997) is given below.
4This multiplicity of neutrally stable outcomes is a reﬂection of the ‘folk theorems’ establishing multiplicity
of Nash equilibria in inﬁnitely repeated games. Although neutral stability reﬁnes the set of Nash equilibria,
it does not do so appreciably. As is well known, the same applies to other reﬁnements such as subgame
perfection (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986).
8stability yields surprisingly sharp predictions.
2.3 Costly Complexity
One approach to introducing complexity costs into the analysis is to suppose that when
two strategies yield identical payoﬀs, the less complex strategy has a ﬁtness advantage.
Complexity costs become relevant only in the case of equal payoﬀs: when two strategies earn
unequal payoﬀs, we continue to assume that the one with the higher payoﬀ has a ﬁtness
advantage regardless of any diﬀerences in complexity. The level of complexity of a strategy
is simply the number of distinct states in the corresponding automaton.
Binmore and Samuelson (1992) adopt this speciﬁcation of costly complexity and look for
population states which satisfy a modiﬁed version of neutral stability. As above, consider a
population consisting largely of some incumbent strategy together with a small proportion
of some mutant strategy. In the Binmore and Samuelson model a mutant can invade if either
(i) the mutant does better against the incumbent than the incumbent does against itself, or
( i i )t h em u t a n td o e sa sw e l la g a i n s tt h ei n c u m b e n tt h a tt h ei n c u m b e n td o e sa g a i n s ti t s e l f ,
but better against itself than the incumbent does against it, or (iii) the mutant does as well
against the incumbent that the incumbent does against itself, as well against itself than
the incumbent does against it, and is less complex. A strategy that cannot be invaded is a
modiﬁed neutrally stable strategy.
Note that any strategy which does not require the use of all states when matched against
itself cannot be a modiﬁed NSS, since it can be invaded by an otherwise identical mutant
obtained by deleting the unused state and arbitrarily ‘rewiring’ all paths leading to that
state. In particular, the class of strategies described in (2) above cannot be stable since
state Sk+1 is never entered when this strategy is matched against itself. Similarly, ‘tit-for-
tat’ is not a modiﬁed NSS, because the less complex strategy which always cooperates can
invade. In fact no strategy which is “nice” in the sense of never being the ﬁrst to defect can
be a modiﬁed NSS since it must be either the one-state cooperator, or it must have some
redundant states which can be dropped without aﬀecting its payoﬀs.












9Binmore and Samuelson show that in any two person game, any modiﬁed NSS must be
eﬃcient in the sense that the combined payoﬀ obtained when such a strategy is matched
against itself is the maximum attainable combined payoﬀ. Their result is based on the
following argument. Suppose there exists an incumbent strategy which is a modiﬁed NSS
but which is not eﬃcient. Since complexity is costly, this strategy must use all of its states,
so it must enter each state at least once. Consider a mutant which takes an initial action
that diﬀers from that taken by the incumbent. If its opponent also takes this action (thereby
identifying itself as being a mutant), then the mutant switches to the initial state of some
eﬃcient strategy and mimics this eﬃcient strategy thereafter. If, instead, its opponent takes
an initial action that is identical to that which the incumbent takes, the mutant switches to
the state which the incumbent would switch to when encountering the action taken by the
mutant, and imitates the incumbent thereafter. Although this mutant will generally be more
complex, it obtains the same payoﬀ against the incumbent as the incumbent does against
itself, and it earns a strictly higher payoﬀ against itself than the incumbent does against it.
It can, therefore, invade.5
The use of evolutionary stability as an equilibrium reﬁnement in a model of costly com-
plexity allows Binmore and Samuelson to obtain a sharp characterization of stable outcomes.
While the analysis shows that evolutionary stability predicts eﬃciency in the presence of
complexity costs, it also shows that a ‘nice’ strategy such as ‘tit-for-tat’ cannot be stable.
Stable strategies such as (3) defect at ﬁrst contact as a means of identifying each other,
and then cooperate thereafter, conditional on cooperation by their opponent. This leaves an
uncomfortable gap between the theory and the empirical results on reciprocal behavior, a
point to which we return below.
An alternative approach to incorporating complexity costs into the analysis is to treat
such costs as ongoing deductions from the stage game payoﬀs. Models of this kind have
been studied by Hirshleifer and Martinez Coll (1988) and Rosenthal (1997). Rosenthal
groups together all strategies that cooperate initially, maintain cooperation against uncon-
ditional cooperators, and defect after the ﬁrst period against unconditional defectors under
one umbrella, referring to them as strategies that ‘trust but verify’. Such strategies include
‘tit-for-tat’, ‘grim’ and a variety of others. In populations consisting only of unconditional
cooperators, unconditional defectors, and ‘trust-but-verify’ strategies, all ‘trust-but-verify’
strategies are behaviorally indistinguishable from each other in all interactions and therefore
5Notice that the initial action of the mutant serves as a signal by which it identiﬁes itself to others of its
kind. The importance of such signals for achieving cooperation is discussed further below.
10earn the same payoﬀ. It is assumed the additional complexity of such strategies involves
an ongoing cost κ which is deducted from their payoﬀ in each period. For the prisoners’
dilemma, the limit-average payoﬀsa r et h e r e f o r eg i v e nb y
C D T
C β − α −α β − α
D β 0 0
T β − α − κ −κ β − α − κ
where T denotes a ‘trust-but-verify’ strategy.6 Starting with some arbitrarily given popula-
tion composition in which all three types are present, suppose that the population compo-
sition evolves under pressure of diﬀerential payoﬀs such that the population share of more
highly rewarded strategies grows more rapidly than that of less highly rewarded strategies.
Under any such dynamics, it is easily seen that a population of unconditional defectors
will be asymptotically stable. It can be shown, however, that under some such dynamics
(including the commonly studied replicator dynamics) there may be an additional asymp-
totically stable population state in which all three types are present. Such a state exists if
κ is suﬃciently small. While the population share of ‘trust-but-verify’ strategies as a whole
is determined by the condition that all three strategies earn the same payoﬀ at the interior
stable state, the speciﬁc ‘trust-but-verify’ strategies of which this group is composed remains
indeterminate. Since all such strategies earn the same payoﬀs, however, the indeterminacy
is not consequential.
This model seems more favorable to the evolution of reciprocity via repetition than those
based on lexicographic complexity costs. However, the argument relies on the assumption
that only the three speciﬁed classes of strategies are present in the population. Allowing for
mutants that are outside this class undermines both the asymptotic stability of the more
eﬃcient state and the irrelevance of the speciﬁc ‘trust-but-verify’ strategies that are present
in the population, provided that complexity costs remain small relative to total payoﬀse v e n
for somewhat more complex strategies. For instance, if the only ‘trust-but-verify’ strategy in
the population were the ‘tit-for-tat’ type, the following strategy could invade a population









−→ S2 : D
D −→ S3 : C
D −→ S4 : D
6Rosenthal considers the discounted sum of payoﬀs rather than the limit average, but the diﬀerence is
not consequential for the present discussion.
11This strategy begins by defecting twice, then continues to defect as long as its opponent con-
tinues to cooperate. If the opponent defects, it switches to the ‘grim’ strategy of conditional
cooperation. Such a strategy is strictly superior to ‘tit-for-tat’ in any population in which
unconditional cooperators are present together with unconditional defectors and ‘tit-for-tat’
types. If its additional complexity does not come at too great a cost, it will outperform all
three strategies at Rosenthal’s interior steady state.
Including complexity costs explicitly in the payoﬀ function causes a population of perpet-
ual defectors to become asymptotically stable under payoﬀ monotonic selection dynamics, so
eﬃciency is no longer an inevitable outcome. If complexity is not too costly, there may exist
other asymptotically stable states, for instance consisting of the strategy (3). The intro-
duction of complexity costs directly into the payoﬀ function, therefore, erodes the sharpness
of the predictions obtained under the somewhat less appealing hypothesis of lexicographic
costs.
2.4 Implementation Errors
Another method of selecting among stable outcomes in certain games (including the prison-
ers’ dilemma) has been found by Fudenberg and Maskin (1990), who disregard complexity
costs but allow for the fact that there may be a small probability of errors in the implemen-
tation of a strategy, so that the action a player intends to take does not match the one that
is actually taken. As in Binmore and Samuelson (1992), only strategies of ﬁnite complexity
are considered. It is assumed that if two strategies yield the same payoﬀ conditional on n
errors, for all n =0 ,1,...,m −1, then the one which yields a higher payoﬀ conditional on m
errors has the higher ﬁtness. In particular if two strategies yield the same payoﬀ conditional
on no errors, then the one which yields a higher payoﬀ conditional on a single error has the
higher ﬁtness. An incumbent strategy is stable in this framework if it is at least as ﬁta sa l l
other mutant strategies in a population consisting almost entirely of the incumbent strategy.
This stability notion generalizes neutral stability to allow for the presence of rare mistakes
which cause intended and realized actions to diﬀer.
In the presence of implementation errors, it is necessary to specify not only how a strategy
responds from a given state to the action taken by its opponent, but also how it responds in
the case of an error on its own part. The ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy, which takes whichever action











Note that a single (unintended) defection can trigger an inﬁnite sequence of alternating
cooperation and defection which is clearly ineﬃcient. Fudenberg and Maskin show that in a
class of games which includes the prisoners’ dilemma, strategies which satisfy their deﬁnition
of evolutionary stability cannot have this property: they must result in eﬃcient play after
every history.
To obtain some intuition for their argument, consider any history of play in which both
players have cooperated in all periods except the last period, in which exactly one player
has defected. Suppose that the incumbent strategy results in ineﬃcient play after this
history (conditional on no subsequent errors). Then a mutant which is identical to the
incumbent strategy except after this particular history can invade, provided that the mutant
switches to eﬃcient play after this history when matched against itself, and successfully
mimics the incumbent when matched against the incumbent. Fudenberg and Maskin show
that it is always possible to construct such a mutant for any such incumbent. This mutant
is indistinguishable from the incumbent except after one particular history. If this history
occurs, the mutant does as well as the incumbent when matched against the incumbent, but
strictly better when matched against itself. Such a mutant strategy can invade, and hence
no incumbent which does not attain eﬃciency after every history can be stable.












This strategy cooperates if and only if both players took the same action in the previous
period. An accidental defection leads to a single period of mutual defection after which
there is a return to mutual cooperation. Such a strategy is eﬃcient after every history,
7An ordered pair of actions associated with an arrow now represents the vector of actions that cause that
transition from one state to another, with the ﬁrst component being the player’s own action and the second
the other player’s action.
13which requires it to be only mildly punitive after a defection. As in the case of (3), however,
the strategy (4) does not easily ﬁt an intuitive notion of reciprocal behavior. The criterion
of evolutionary stability in the face of implementation errors therefore not only eliminates
ineﬃcient strategies, it also eliminates a number of intuitively appealing eﬃcient ones.
3 Reciprocity in Sporadic Interactions
When interactions are sporadic the possibilities for punishment are limited and the conditions
for the evolution of reciprocity are accordingly more stringent. Consider for instance the case
of a large population the members of which are repeatedly matched pairwise at random to
play the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma with payoﬀsa sg i v e na b o v e .I fs is the population share
of cooperators, then the expected payoﬀ to a defector is simply βs while that to a cooperator
is βs − α. From any initial state in which both types are present, the population evolves to
the state in which only defectors are present. There is no scope for reciprocal behavior and
the only stable outcome is the least eﬃcient one.
There are at least two distinct ways in which reciprocity in sporadic interactions can be
modeled. First, one could permit explicit punishment possibilities as part of the interaction,
for instance by adding a stage to the game in which punishment in the form of costly sanctions
may be imposed on others. Second, one could allow for the possibility that individuals
interact selectively, rather than randomly, with others in the population, or condition their
behavior on some potentially observable property that identiﬁes a group to which their
opponent belongs. We begin with the second case.
3.1 Assortation and Parochialism
Consider players from a large population matched to play the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma.
Players are programmed to either cooperate or defect. A cooperator meets another cooper-
ator with probability r and a random member of the population with probability 1−r.T h e
same interaction probabilities apply to defectors. After players have been matched, they
receive payoﬀs and reproduce in proportion to those payoﬀs. The next generation of players
is then matched again according to the interaction rule above. If the degree of assortative
interaction is suﬃciently high, the fraction of cooperators in the population will grow. To
see this, observe that if the population share of cooperators is s, then the expected payoﬀ
to a cooperator is β (r +( 1− r)s)−α while the expected payoﬀ to a defector is β (1 − r)s.
The share of cooperators will increase over time if and only if r>α/β, that is, if the rate of
14assortative interaction is above the cost-beneﬁtr a t i o . 8
As the example above makes clear, all that is required for cooperative behavior to evolve
(even in one-shot interactions) is that interaction be suﬃciently assortative. Assortation may
also arise endogenously, if individuals with a propensity to cooperate deliberately seek out
other cooperators with whom to interact. This can be achieved if those with a propensity to
cooperate are able to communicate this to each other by some pre-game signal.9 Assortation
is conditioned on the predicted behavior of others and, if signals are suﬃciently sharp,
cooperators could interact only or mainly with other cooperators (Frank, 1987, 1988).
In Frank’s model, individuals can choose whether or not to play prisoner’s dilemmas
with others from a large population consisting of two types. One type cooperates in all
interactions, and the other always defects. The two types inherit the realization of a random
variable or signal, X, from distributions f(X|C) and f(X|D) respectively. The support of
f(X|C) lies partly to the right of the support of f(X|D), ensuring that at least a fraction
of cooperators are recognizable as such with certainty. High values of X signal that a player
is more likely to be a cooperator so such players are in demand as partners. The resulting
sorting process leads to partial assortation: cooperators are more likely to be matched with
other cooperators than with defectors. The information contained in the signals allows
players to partly control for their opponent’s type in choosing whether or nor to interact
with them. Frank shows that under certain conditions on the payoﬀs, there is an equilibrium
proportion of cooperators which evolves. The intuition for this is that when most members
of the population cooperate, then everyone is less discriminating in whom they choose to
interact with because they can aﬀord to be. This allows the share of defectors to grow until
cooperators become suﬃciently wary to prevent further growth in the defector share.
The assumption that at least a fraction of cooperators are recognizable with certainty,
regardless of the population composition, is critical in allowing cooperators to invade a
population of defectors. Without this assumption, the posterior probability that a player is
a cooperator conditional on the value of X goes to zero as the population share of cooperators
approaches zero.10 Without recognition, therefore, cooperators will fail to match with each
8This condition, known as Hamilton’s rule, has a biological interpretation in terms of kin selection.
Hamilton’s rule states that an altruistic gene will spread in a population if individuals share at least a
proportion r of their genes on average with those with whom they interact. In this context r is said to be
the coeﬃcient of relatedness (Hamilton, 1964).
9There is some experimental evidence to support the notion that individuals can predict when others will
cooperate in prisoners’ dilemmas after spending half an hour with them (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993).
10This would be less of an issue if the population were ﬁnite. In that case, even a single mutant has a
non-zero population share, so that if the signal that players get about a player’s type is suﬃciently sharp,
15other and cannot do better than defectors. Another potential objection to this account of
the evolution of conditional cooperators is that a mutant who fakes the signal successfully
could receive the beneﬁts of cooperation without paying any of its costs. However, the ease
of falsifying a signal of altruism should not be exaggerated. For such a mutation to be
selected for, there must already be conditional cooperators present in the population. It is
not at all clear that a mutation that perfectly copies the signal will arrive in any reasonable
evolutionary time. What is more likely is the arrival of a mutant with an imperfect copy of
the signal, which is precisely what is modeled by Frank.
While the discussion of signals in the formal models is entirely abstract, Hirshleifer (1987)
and Frank (1988) have argued that behavioral propensities are at least in part determined
by emotional states. Since emotions are mostly not under conscious control, and since their
outward expressions are also only partly so, it is diﬃcult to fake emotional states associated
with particular behaviors. This line of argument suggests that while particular behavioral
propensities and signals may evolve culturally, their credibility is at least partly a consequence
of biological evolution. It also goes some way towards explaining why face-to-face interactions
appear to generate more trust and cooperative behavior than those conducted electronically.
Another implication of this observation is that reciprocity between large institutions such as
ﬁrms or nation-states may have a basis that is quite diﬀerent from that observed between
individuals or small groups.
To continue with the discussion of models with signals, note that even if individuals
cannot select their partners, they may be able to condition their behavior on a signal. We
refer to this dependence of actions on opponents’ types as parochialism. Robson (1990)
considers the case of a mutant which emits a signal, and cooperates if and only if the signal
is detected in the other player. If one adds the mutant strategy M to the payoﬀ matrix (1),
t h ef o l l o w i n gd e s c r i b e st h ep a y o ﬀst ot h et h r e ep l a y e r s :
C D M
C β − α −α −α
D β 0 0
M β 0 β − α
Even under purely random (nonassortative) matching, the such a mutant drives cooperators
and defectors to extinction since the expected payoﬀst oM are strictly greater than the
payoﬀs to the other types whenever the population share of M is strictly positive. Such
behavior represents a parochial form of reciprocity, where cooperation is induced by means
even though never perfectly revealing, it will suﬃce to enable cooperators to attain higher expected payoﬀs.
16of a “secret handshake”. As Robson recognizes, however, a population consisting of such
reciprocators is itself vulnerable to invasion by a second mutant which perfectly mimics the
signal but always defects; such defecting mimics can drive the reciprocators to extinction.
This suggests an endless evolutionary cycle involving the successful spread of parochial re-
ciprocators with new signals, who are subsequently eliminated by defectors who develop the
ability to perfectly mimic the signal. Alternatively, if the ability to mimic is imperfect, it is
possible for mimics to coexist with reciprocators in the long run for reasons similar to those
discussed in the context of Frank’s model above.
Yet another way of attaining conditional cooperation on the basis of signals is to use
a prior cooperative act itself as a signal, thus rendering it diﬃcult to falsify. Nowak and
Sigmund (1998) take this route. In their model, players are randomly matched in pairs, one
as a potential donor (helper) of a beneﬁt β which costs α and one as a potential recipient.
A player’s “image score” in each encounter is 1 if on his last encounter as a donor, he helped
the recipient, 0 if he did not. Consider two possible strategies, ‘discriminate’, that is, help
if (and only if) the recipient’s image score is 1, and ‘defect’, that is, never help.11 If the
probability q that a potential recipient’s image score is known to the potential donor is
greater than α/β, then both strategies are asymptotically stable under payoﬀ monotonic
dynamics. However, with the introduction of a third strategy, ‘always help’, ‘discriminate’
is no longer asymptotically stable (though it remains weakly stable). The problem is that
when there are no defectors in the population, the other two strategies get equal payoﬀs.
With no selection pressure against the helpers, they can come to constitute the bulk of the
population through random drift, after which defectors can invade. Moreover, the defector
equilibrium remains asymptotically stable. This problem of reciprocity being undermined
by the gradual encroachment of unconditional cooperation is pervasive in the literature.
3.2 Costly Sanctions
In sporadic interactions in which one cannot condition behavior on a pre-game signal, or
interact selectively with some subset of the population, reciprocity can still evolve if there is
the possibility of punishment within the interaction itself. Consider, for instance, the case of
the prisoner’s dilemma augmented by a second ‘sanctioning’ stage. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
after initial actions have been observed, each of the two players has the option of imposing a
punishment on the other which costs γ to the punisher and inﬂicts damage δ on the victim.
11Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) provide some experimental support for indirect reciprocal be-
havior of the kind modeled by Nowak and Sigmund.
17The second stage payoﬀs can be represented by the following matrix, where P represents the
action ‘punish’ and R the action ‘refrain from punishing’.
P R
P −γ − δ −γ
R −δ 0
There are eight possible strategies in this two stage game: two ﬁrst period choices (co-
operation or defection) coupled with one of the following four second period actions: no
punishment, punishment only of defectors, punishment only of cooperators, and punishment
of both cooperators and defectors.
Regardless of the ﬁrst stage outcome, and regardless of one’s expectation of the other
player’s behavior, a self interested individual will always refrain from punishment since there
is to be no further interaction between the players. As a result, the threat of punishment by a
player who is known to be self-interested will not be credible, and when two such individuals
are matched to play the two stage game, the predicted outcome is defection by both at the
ﬁrst stage and no punishment at the second. It is easily veriﬁed that a population in which
only this strategy is present is neutrally stable. However, the strategy which prescribes
cooperation and punishes defection is also neutrally stable.
The possibility that reciprocity in sporadic interactions can be stable even when the
underlying threats of punishment are not ‘credible’ from the perspective of material self-
interest is a special case of a very general phenomenon in extensive form games.12 As in
the case of Nowak and Sigmund’s model of indirect reciprocity, however, this stability is of
a rather tenuous nature. Since unconditional cooperators do as well as reciprocators in the
absence of defectors, the population share of the former can grow through random drift until
defectors are able to invade. A neutrally stable population of unconditional defectors is not
vulnerable in this sense. In a population of defectors there may be growth by random drift of
the rather perverse strategy ‘defect and punish cooperation’, but any population consisting
of these two strategies is itself uninvadable. The stability of defection is more robust than
that of reciprocity.13 Notice, though, that this result is obtained without assuming that the
12See Somanathan (1997) for more on this point. Gale, Binmore and Samuelson (1995) and Sethi and
Somanathan (1996) apply this insight to ultimatum bargaining and common pool resource games respectively;
see also Axelrod (1986) for a simulation study of a prisoner’s dilemma model with costly sanctioning that
has similar properties. Boyd and Richerson (1992) consider targeted retribution in large groups in the case
of inﬁnitely repeated interactions, again ﬁnding cooperation sustained by threats of punishment to be one
of numerous stable outcomes.
13One way to strengthen the stability of cooperation enforced by threats of punishment is to include ongoing
18commitment to punish defection is observable.
Observability of the commitment to punish defection gives rise to additional possibilities.
Sethi (1996) considers the stability properties of various population states in the model
discussed above, under the additional hypothesis that there exists a self-interested type who,
instead of being programmed to play any particular strategy, plays an optimal response
to its opponent’s strategy at each interaction.14 When two such optimizers interact, they
play according to the standard game theoretic prediction, which entails defection and no
sanctioning. A population of reciprocators remains neutrally stable in the presence of such
optimizers. Moreover, a population of optimizers is itself unstable and vulnerable to invasion
by the reciprocator strategy provided that the damage δ from punishment exceeds the cost
α of cooperating. When δ exceeds α, optimizers cooperate with reciprocators to avoid being
punished. Reciprocators can eliminate optimizers in a population consisting only of these
two types, since they obtain a payoﬀ of β −α in each interaction, while opportunists obtain
β −α only when matched with reciprocators and 0 when matched with each other.15 When
o n ea l l o w sf o ra l lp o s s i b l em u t a n t s ,h o w e v e r ,t h e r ec a nb eo t h e rs t a b l ep o p u l a t i o ns t a t e s .A
population of defectors who never punish is also neutrally stable, as is a population consisting
of a combination of optimizers and ‘bullies’, where the latter defect at the ﬁrst stage but
punish defection by their opponent. When matched against bullies, optimizers cooperate
to avoid punishment, and when matched against each other they defect since threats of
punishment are not credible. In evolutionary equilibrium, the advantage that bullies have
when facing opportunists is exactly outweighed by the substantial costs they incur when
facing each other. Hence, while reciprocity is a stable outcome, it is just one of several such
outcomes.
The introduction of self-interested optimizers into an otherwise standard evolutionary
random drift explicitly in the model along the lines of Binmore and Samuelson (1999). If punishments are
suﬃciently severe and all types of mutations are equally likely, it is possible for there to be an asymptotically
stable population state in which multiple types (including reciprocators) are present, and in which almost
all individuals cooperate.
14This device of introducing rational players into an otherwise standard evolutionary game theoretic model
had previously been employed by Banerjee and Weibull (1994), who explore conditions under which ‘non-
rational’ types can survive.
15A population of optimizers would be stable if optimizers could not tell diﬀerent opponents apart and
were therefore forced to take the same action in each interaction, where this action is chosen optimally
on the basis of the overall population composition. The ability to recognize reciprocators and adjust their
behavior raises the payoﬀs of optimizers, but not as much as it raises the payoﬀs of reciprocators; the latter
are therefore able to invade.
19game theoretic framework produces a hybrid model in which some players are programmed
to play a particular behavioral strategy while others (the optimizers) are ﬂexible enough
alter their behavior depending on their beliefs about their opponent. Gintis (2000) takes
this feature further in a model of the evolution of reciprocal behavior in a public goods
setting in which there are two types of players, reciprocators and defectors, both of whom
are ﬂexible. In this model, groups of a ﬁxed size are formed at random every period. Defectors
contribute to the public good only if they ﬁnd themselves in a group in which the proportion
of reciprocators is high enough that a failure to contribute results in a punishment that
outweighs the cost of contributing. Reciprocators contribute to the public good only if
they ﬁnd themselves in a group in which they are in a high enough proportion that all
players contribute. In such groups, they are known to be willing to punish players who
do not contribute, although doing so is costly. Reciprocators neither contribute nor punish
when they ﬁnd themselves in a group in which their numbers would be insuﬃcient to deter
defection even if they were to punish it. Thus, although groups may contain any proportion of
reciprocators, the parochial behavior of reciprocators, whose commitment to punish defection
depends on the proportion of their own type in their group, has a homogenizing eﬀect on
behavior: there are only two kinds of groups; those in which all players contribute, and those
in which none do. The evolutionary advantage of reciprocators arises from their being more
likely than defectors to be in groups in which the public good is provided.
The model as described thus far would clearly result in the extinction of defectors, a
result that is belied by data which show that a signiﬁcant fraction of individuals behave like
defectors (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Gintis, however, makes the realistic assumption that
monitoring costs incurred by reciprocators in groups in which they predominate lower their
payoﬀs below those of defectors in these groups. If defectors are rare, most groups containing
defectors will be of this kind. This enables defectors to invade a population of reciprocators.
Gintis shows that, provided the monitoring cost is not too high, reciprocators will get higher
average payoﬀs than defectors when the latter predominate in the population. Thus, the
model predicts the evolution of a mixed population.
4 Reciprocity as a Preference
In the last model discussed, all players were ﬂexible without necessarily being self-interested.
The literature reviewed in this section takes this ﬂexibility a step further by modeling reci-
procity as an attribute of individual preferences rather than of a behavioral strategy. In this
20framework, individuals are endowed with psychological payoﬀ functions or utility functions,
which may or may not be materially self-interested, and are assumed to take actions con-
sistent with a Nash equilibrium of the game deﬁned by their psychological payoﬀ functions.
This naturally allows individual behavior to be ﬂexible in the sense that a given individual
may take diﬀerent actions against opponents with diﬀerent preferences. As before, traits
which are more successful with respect to material rewards are passed on to future gen-
erations with greater frequency. The traits in question are preferences, however, and not
strategies. Whether or not preferences for reciprocity are stable in this setting is the main
question of interest.
The basic idea underlying much of the literature on the evolution of non-opportunistic
preferences is that a recognized adherence to such preferences can provide a commitment
device that allows non-opportunists to outperform opportunists in certain strategic environ-
ments. The idea goes back at least as far as Schelling (1960) who observed that self-interested
individuals would seek to pretend other motivations but that such pretences were liable to
be imperfect. This theme has recurred in the work of Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1987,
1988), where emotional or otherwise “irrational” motivations can be proﬁtable to those who
possess them provided that they are at least partially observable and induce adjustments in
the behavior of others. Building on this work, models of preference evolution have been de-
veloped in which all players are assumed to be maximizers of utility but to diﬀer with respect
to the relationship between material payoﬀs and subjective utilities (Güth and Yaari, 1992,
Güth and Kliemt, 1992, Güth, 1995). Utilities determine equilibria which in turn determine
material payoﬀs and hence evolutionary stability. This is the so-called indirect evolutionary
approach.
4.1 Game-Speciﬁc Preferences
An essential component of models adopting the indirect evolutionary approach is the dis-
tinction between material and psychological payoﬀ functions. Self-interested individuals or
opportunists have psychological payoﬀst h a ta r ei d e n t i c a lt ot h e i rm a t e r i a lp a y o ﬀs, but not
all players are self-interested. Given a speciﬁc game, preferences for reciprocity can be rep-
resented in terms of a particular transformation of the material payoﬀ function to obtain a
psychological payoﬀ function. In Güth and Yaari’s (1992) analysis of the ultimatum bargain-
ing game, for instance, a reciprocator is deﬁned as an individual who gains subjective pleasure
from rejecting unfair oﬀers (but who does not gain subjective pleasure from proposing fair
divisions). If this propensity is observable all proposers will make fair oﬀers to reciprocators
21and unfair ones to opportunists, resulting in greater material rewards to former. Even when
the preferences of one’s opponent are only partially observable, for instance through a signal
that is correlated with preferences, reciprocators can survive and spread in a population of
opportunists if the signal is suﬃciently informative.16
Applying this approach to the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma described in (1) above, sup-
pose that reciprocators diﬀer from opportunists in that they get some subjective disutility
when they defect against someone who cooperates. If their willingness to pay to avoid this
is ρ > α, the payoﬀs to a reciprocator are given by
C D
C β − α −α
D β − ρ 0
If ρ > α then mutual cooperation emerges as a second equilibrium outcome in this game when
two reciprocators interact (the prisoners’ dilemma is transformed into a coordination game).
Consider a large population with two types, reciprocators and opportunists, in which players
are randomly matched to play the one-shot prisoners’ dilemma. Provided that reciprocators
can be recognized as such, and interactions involving two reciprocators result in the selection
of the eﬃcient equilibrium, material payoﬀs to reciprocators will be strictly positive, unlike
the material payoﬀs to opportunists. Reciprocators will drive opportunists to extinction
(Guttman, 2000).
Note the crucial role played by the hypothesis that preferences are observable. With no
information about types, a reciprocator population will be invaded by opportunists provided
that reciprocators continue to attempt coordination on the eﬃcient equilibrium when they
believe with suﬃciently high probability that their opponent is a reciprocator. This occurs
because reciprocators will cooperate with all opponents (including opportunists, whom they
cannot identify) when the population share of reciprocators is close to 1. Since opportunists
defect in all interactions, their payoﬀs will exceed that obtained by reciprocators and their
population share will rise. This process continues until the population share of reciprocators
drops to a level at which reciprocators ﬁnd the probability of being matched with each other
16Huck and Oechssler (1999) show that preferences for rejecting unfair oﬀe r sc a ns u r v i v ee v e nw h e np r e f -
erences are unobservable, provided that individuals interact in small groups and the preference distribution
in the group is known to all. In the role of a proposer, reciprocators have an advantage over materialists
since their opponent is less likely to be a reciprocator, so that unfair oﬀers are less likely to be rejected. In
the role of a responder, reciprocators have a disadvantage relative to materialists since they reject unfair
oﬀers, but this disadvantage is negligible since unfair oﬀers are worth almost nothing to the responder.
22too small to make cooperation worthwhile. At this point all individuals defect and one is
left with a population of behaviorally indistinguishable reciprocators and opportunists.
If we introduce imperfect information about types in the form of a signal as described
in the previous section, and some values of the signal perfectly identify reciprocators, then
they will be able to invade (because those reciprocators with the appropriate signal values,
when matched with each other, will achieve the eﬃcient equilibrium, while the remaining
reciprocators will be behaviorally indistinguishable from opportunists). This ﬁnding is driven
by essentially the same logic as that of Frank (1987) described in the previous section.
Allowing for a player’s strategy to be conditioned on his opponent’s type (parochialism)
rather than simply allowing a player to choose whether or not to play (which results in
assortation) yields essentially the same result.
These results rely on suﬃciently informative signals. This is a strong assumption since, as
noted earlier, evolution would favor mimics who fake the signal. What if, instead, the quality
of the signal is arbitrarily poor?17 In this case reciprocators cannot invade a population of
opportunists because when the latter’s population share is close to 1, reciprocators will con-
sider it extremely likely that they are matched with an opportunist even if they observe the
reciprocator signal. This induces them to ignore the signal and defect against all opponents,
so that the two types get equal payoﬀs. However, there will exist some threshold value of the
reciprocator population share such that, when two reciprocators are matched and both (are
commonly known to) observe a signal, each player’s posterior probability that he is facing
a reciprocator becomes high enough to make mutual cooperation an equilibrium. Suppose
that reciprocators always cooperate in this situation, that is, when both players are com-
monly known to have received signals, and defect otherwise. In this case the only diﬀerence
between reciprocator and opportunist payoﬀs arises due to the fact that reciprocators coop-
erate when both players are commonly known to have received signals, while opportunists
defect. If signal quality is suﬃciently low, opportunists will outperform reciprocators: they
will be approximately as likely as reciprocators to ﬁnd themselves in a situation where both
players observe signals, and will get a strictly greater payoﬀ than reciprocators do in this
situation. What works against the reciprocators here is that the opportunists’ payoﬀ advan-
tage from defection outweighs their loss from being slightly less likely to be thought to be
reciprocators.
There is a simple way of making the payoﬀ advantage from defection small: by allowing
17Suppose the signal X takes two values: zero and one. We mean that P(X =1 |R) can be made
arbitrarily close to P(X =1 |O),w h e r eR denotes a reciprocator and O denotes an opportunist. Suppose
P(X =1 |R) >P(X =1 |O). We shall refer to a signal value of 1 as a ‘reciprocator signal’.
23players to play repeatedly in a single generation and letting the number of periods of play be
suﬃciently large. Guttman (1999) considers the possibility that there are a large but ﬁnite
and commonly known number of periods of interaction in each generation. Each player
in a generation inherits a particular realization of a signal X and players are randomly
matched with others in each period. The entire history of a player’s play is known to
all potential opponents, and, contingent on the observed history and signal, players may
choose not to interact with their assigned opponent and be randomly matched with someone
else instead. If the population share r of reciprocators is suﬃciently low, reciprocators are
behaviorally indistinguishable from opportunists and defect in each period regardless of the
observed signal. Guttman shows that there exists an intermediate range of values of r
for which only players with the “good” value of the signal cooperate with each other. Of
these, the reciprocators cooperate for all periods while the opportunists cooperate for all
periods except the last.18 Thus players with the “good” value of the signal get much higher
payoﬀs than those with the “bad” value, and among these, opportunists do slightly better
than reciprocators. By making the number of periods suﬃciently large, this advantage of
opportunists is shrunk until it is overwhelmed by the greater probability that reciprocators
will have the “good” value of the signal, even though the probability of having the good value
of the signal is only slightly greater for the reciprocators than for opportunists. Finally, for r
suﬃciently large, the probability of a player being a reciprocator is so high that reciprocators
always cooperate, thus giving the advantage to opportunists. In consequence, there is an
interior value of r, say r∗, with a non-trivial basin of attraction under the evolutionary
dynamics. For lower values of r,p a y o ﬀsa r ee q u a ls oi ti sp o s s i b l ef o rr to enter the basin of
attraction of r∗ through random drift after which it will be ﬁxed near that value by selection.
Hence, the model predicts the coexistence of opportunists and reciprocators in the long run.
This section has so far emphasized the importance of informative signals regarding player
types for the evolution of reciprocity via parochialism or assortation. In contrast, recent
papers by Friedman and Singh (1999) and Bowles and Gintis (1999) deal with the evolution
of reciprocity when individual preferences are unobservable. These two papers diﬀer in a
number of details but share in common with the models discussed in Section 3.2 the feature
that players may punish noncooperative behavior by others at some cost to themselves.
Reciprocators are deﬁned as individuals who have a taste for, and therefore are committed
18Materialists cooperate in all periods except the last because a failure to do so would expose them as
materialists and lead to defection by their opponents in all subsequent periods. The idea that even a small
probability of being mistaken for a type that is not self-interested can lead to dramatic eﬀects on equilibrium
behavior in the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma was developed in a seminal paper by Kreps et al. (1982).
24to, punishing noncooperative behavior. Bowles and Gintis assume that society is segmented
into distinct groups within which interaction occurs. If noncooperative behavior is detected
and punished, individuals are ostracized from their group. Although reciprocators may
also behave noncooperatively in equilibrium (and hence face punishment and expulsion),
opportunists behave noncooperatively with greater frequency and are therefore more likely
to be expelled. This results in assortative interaction: reciprocators are more likely than
opportunists to be in a group with a large proportion of reciprocators. This compensates
for the losses incurred by costly sanctioning of noncooperative behavior and both types
can coexist in the long run. As in many other models, however, this conclusion depends
critically on the assumption that there does not exist a type of player who cooperates but
refuses to sanction noncooperative behavior. Such pure altruists would escape the costs of
inﬂicting punishment while continuing to enjoy the advantages of assortative interaction thus
destabilizing any population state in which reciprocators are present.
Friedman and Singh consider a population divided into a number of distinct groups and
consider pairwise interactions involving members of diﬀerent groups. As before, reciprocators
are deﬁned as individuals who have a taste for punishing noncooperative behavior. Although
such individual tastes are unobservable, each group has a “vengeance norm” which prescribes
some level of punishment. The group to which an individual belongs is itself observable, and
this provides information regarding that individual’s propensity for punishment. Members
of groups which prescribe a vengeance norm beneﬁt from this reputation since the threat
of punishment induces their opponents to behave cooperatively. Moreover, individuals face
incentives to adhere to their group norms since they are punished for deviations by their
fellow group members. Speciﬁcally, the punishment is imposed by a group on one of its
m e m b e r sw h of a i l st ob es u ﬃciently vengeful in an interaction with an outsider, and consists
of a loss of status for that individual, which has material consequences. Friedman and
Singh assume that this second-order punishment is costless to impose, and on this basis
obtain asymptotic stability of reciprocal preferences. This result depends critically on the
assumption of costless (second-order) punishment because in the presence of such punishment
costs, individuals who do not punish deviators would enjoy an evolutionary advantage over
those who do, which in turn would lead to an erosion of the vengeance norm and ultimately
to the decay of cooperation itself.19
19One way to recover the result would be to assume, as in Akerlof’s (1976) model of ‘caste equilibrium’, that
those who fail to ostracize are themselves ostracized and so on, ad inﬁnitum. Then it becomes necessary to
assume not only that the original oﬀence is observable, but that all higher-order oﬀences are also observable.
254.2 Universal Preferences
Within the context of particular games, one may represent preferences for reciprocity by
some transformation of the material payoﬀ functions that makes intuitive sense. It is pos-
sible, however, to model preferences for reciprocity in an entirely diﬀerent way, one which
is independent of any particular game or strategic environment. Recent research, motivated
by the search for a uniﬁed explanation of the results from diﬀerent experimental games, has
proposed speciﬁcations of preferences which are context-free, that is, which are applicable
to any game. While the game-speciﬁc preferences considered in the previous section can be
interpreted as reduced forms of some underlying (though unspeciﬁed) universal preferences,
the literature reviewed in this section is based on an explicit speciﬁcation of such preferences.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have recently provided spec-
iﬁcations of preference interdependence in which individuals are assumed to care not only
about their own material payoﬀs but about the entire distribution of payoﬀs. Although
they diﬀer with respect to a number of details, both papers require that individuals expe-
rience some disutility from being at either extreme of the payoﬀ distribution, that is, they
have some aversion to inequality. These papers are able to explain much more of the data
from laboratory experiments than can simpler speciﬁcations of preference interdependence.
A second group of papers explicitly adopts the approach of psychological games in which
player utilities depend not just on action proﬁles, but also on their initial beliefs (Geanako-
plos et al., 1989, Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998, Falk and Fischbacher,
1998). In equilibrium, all beliefs (including higher-order beliefs) are correct, and individuals
take optimal actions conditional on these beliefs and the actions of others. Diﬀerent beliefs
(corresponding to diﬀerent equilibria) imply possibly diﬀerent utility proﬁles at any given
action proﬁle. This endogeneity of utility proﬁles represents a considerable departure from
standard game theoretic methodology. Papers using the apparatus of psychological games
to explain data from experiments are based on the hypothesis that beliefs about the kind-
ness or unkindness of opponent strategies will give rise to the desire to reciprocate, where
the kindness or unkindness of an individual’s strategy is assessed in terms of the (material)
payoﬀ implications of other strategies available to them.20
20Charness and Rabin (2000) have recently proposed an alternative model which incorporates a concern
for eﬃciency, distributional justice, and reciprocity. Individuals place some weight on a “disinterested social
ideal” which itself reﬂects a concern for eﬃciency (maximizing the sum of all payoﬀs) and a Rawlsian notion
of justice (maximizing the payoﬀ of the least well-endowed) but are prepared to abandon this ideal and
behave selﬁshly or maliciously if they believe that others are behaving in too selﬁsh a manner.
26A third approach is based on the hypothesis that an individual’s utility depends not
only on the distribution of material payoﬀs but also on that individual’s beliefs about the
preferences of others (Levine, 1998). Consider a group of n individuals and any material
payoﬀ distribution (π1,...,πn). The interpretation of these payoﬀsi st h a tt h e ya r i s ef r o mt h e
choice of actions by each individual in some strategic interaction. The psychological payoﬀ
or utility achieved by each individual is assumed by Levine to depend on the material payoﬀ
distribution as follows




where wij is the weight that i places on j’s material payoﬀ. This weight itself depends on
properties of the preferences of the two players. Each player’s preferences are represented by
two parameters ai and λi, where ai may be interpreted as a measure of an individual’s pure
altruism, and λi a measure of the degree to which the weight wij placed by individual i on





Levine argues that a suitably chosen, stable distribution of preferences belonging to this
class can simultaneously account for results from a wide variety of experimental games. This
speciﬁcation does not, however, pass a natural test for evolutionary stability. Note that an
individual i with ai > 0 can never place a negative weight on the payoﬀs of an individual
j who is purely self-interested (ai > 0 and aj =0implies wij > 0). Such behavior, being
altruistic, can survive and spread in competition with opportunist preferences only under
restrictive conditions. This problem does not arise in the following modiﬁcation of Levine’s
preferences:
wij =
ai + λi (aj − ai)
1+λi
. (6)
If both ai and λi are positive, and λi > 1, then the possessor of such a utility function will
be altruistic toward those with a large enough value of a and spiteful toward opportunists.
Consider a large population consisting of two types of preferences, opportunists and
reciprocators, both belonging to the class (6). Opportunists are deﬁned by the parameters
a = λ =0and reciprocators by a>0 and λ > 1. Opportunists place no weight on the









Applying this to the example of the prisoners’ dilemma, when two reciprocators interact, the
payoﬀ matrix is given by
C D
C (β − α)(1+k1) −α + βk1
D β − αk1 0
Provided that k1 > α/β, cooperation is a dominant strategy for each player. It is easily
veriﬁed that when a reciprocator interacts with an opportunist, defection is a dominant
strategy for both players (opportunists defect out of self-interest, reciprocators out of spite).
If preferences are perfectly observable the expected payoﬀ to reciprocators exceeds that to
opportunists regardless of the population composition and the latter are therefore driven to
extinction. Under unobservable preferences, an argument similar to that of Guttman (1999)
can be made to predict a stable population composition in which both types of preference
are present.
While the prisoners’ dilemma example illustrates some of the evolutionary advantages
that such preferences enjoy, it obscures the fact that the potential for spite implicit in these
preferences can confer other advantages. Building on earlier work by Koçkesen et al. (2000),
Sethi and Somanathan (2001) identify a class of games, including multiperson common pool
resource and public goods games, in which such preferences can survive. In this model,
individuals are matched in subgroups of size k drawn randomly from a large population.
The reciprocator advantage stems from two factors: their spiteful behavior when they ﬁnd
themselves in a subgroup consisting mainly of opportunists, and the opportunists’ recogni-
tion of their spite. This recognition causes opportunists to adjust their actions in such a
manner as to increase the material payoﬀs of reciprocators. Provided that reciprocators are
not too spiteful towards opportunists, this results in reciprocators having higher expected
payoﬀs than opportunists when the population share of the latter is suﬃciently high. As
evolutionary pressure raises the population share of reciprocators, their actions become in-
creasingly altruistic (since they are more and more likely to ﬁnd themselves in groups with
many reciprocators). This tends to favor opportunists and may therefore limit the extent
to which the population share of reciprocators can rise. For some parameter values the only
stable population states consist of both types. Note that this argument depends crucially on
28players having suﬃcient information about the preferences of others in their group so that
behavior towards members of the subgroup can be conditioned on its composition.21
If the sorting into subgroups is assortative rather than random, then reciprocators may
have an advantage for a diﬀerent reason. Their altruism towards other reciprocators results in
groups composed exclusively of reciprocators getting higher payoﬀs than groups consisting
exclusively of opportunists. It is the ﬂexibility of reciprocal preferences that gives them
survival advantages in both these very diﬀerent matching environments. Neither purely
altruistic nor purely spiteful preferences have this ﬂexibility. Hence preferences for reciprocity
are able to survive and spread in a broader range of environments than purely altruistic or
spiteful preferences.
5D i s c u s s i o n
Given the pervasiveness and economic importance of reciprocity in human interactions, it
is not surprising that there have been a variety of approaches to understanding how such
behavior can survive and spread in evolutionary competition with opportunistic behavior.
Each of the contributions reviewed above shed some light on the phenomenon. Four basic
themes, repetition, commitment, assortation, and parochialism, have appeared repeatedly in
various guises throughout the literature. Inﬁnite repetition can give rise to the evolution of
behavior that exhibits reciprocity-like features but the stable strategies that emerge in this
environment are less intuitively recognizable as representations of actual human behavior
than strategies such as tit-for-tat, which are unstable. This gulf between the predictions of
theoretical models and the behavior of human subjects in repeated interactions remains to
be bridged. In sporadic interactions, reciprocity can be stable if the propensity to punish
selﬁsh actions can induce opportunists to cooperate, or if reciprocators themselves behave
opportunistically when they expect others to do so. Reciprocity can also be stable in spo-
radic interactions if matching is suﬃciently assortative. In each case, the propensities or
preferences of others must be at least partially observable, the only exception being that
commitment can induce a weak form of stability even when preferences are unobservable.
An implicit assumption made throughout the literature is that traits that are more highly
rewarded in material terms will increase in populations at the expense of those that are less
highly rewarded. This hypothesis is uncontroversial when material payoﬀs are interpreted
21If players in a subgroup receive no information about the preferences of others in their subgroup, then
materialists cannot receive lower expected material payoﬀs than players with other utility functions (Ok and
Vega-Redondo, 2001).
29as Darwinian ﬁtness and the transmission of traits is genetic. But as far as the transmission
of cultural traits is concerned, the hypothesis requires greater scrutiny and alternative dy-
namic processes based on learning, imitation and socialization need to be examined (see, for
instance, Bisin and Verdier, 2001, for an explict model of parental socialization). Cultural
traits that are most easily transmitted to children by parents or peers need not be the ones
that yield the highest material rewards. Complex and varied motives govern the actions of
parents who attempt to instill values, habits or propensities in their children, and the desire
to see their children become materially prosperous need not be a dominant parental concern.
Furthermore, when learning about payoﬀs is costly, there are advantages to imitating fre-
quent behaviors so the transmission of traits may be partly conformist (Boyd and Richerson,
1985). Conformist transmission can overwhelm small payoﬀ disadvantages and, provided
that the costs of sanctioning are low, virtually any behavior enforced by punishments can
be asymptotically stable.
A related question which has received insuﬃcient attention is the time scale over which
meaningful changes in the population composition may be expected to occur. Even in the
case of cultural transmission, traits transmitted horizontally within peer groups can spread
rapidly within a generation, while traits that are transmitted vertically from one generation
to the next, for instance within families, may require several generations to diﬀuse through
the population. Closer attention to the precise manner in which preferences are acquired in
human populations is clearly warranted.
Alternative assumptions regarding population structure also warrant exploration. The
random matching hypothesis is analytically convenient but relatively unrealistic and the
structure of human interaction more closely resembles a network with a high degree of
clustering. Interactions are predominantly with a relatively small set of social ‘neighbors’
and one’s neighbors are quite likely also interact with each other. Recent studies of the
evolution of behavior on simple symmetric networks suggest that cooperation and reciprocity
can be sustained in such environments (Nowak and May 1992, Eshel et al., 1998, Boyd and
Richerson, 2000, Albin and Foley, 2001). The evolution of behavior and preferences in
more complex environments such as ‘small-world’ networks (Watts, 1999) remains to be
systematically explored.
The literature reviewed here includes models in which individuals are boundedly ratio-
nal in an extreme sense, mechanically choosing actions, receiving payoﬀs, and myopically
adjusting their behavior. It also includes models based on the equally extreme assumption
that individuals exhibit an unlimited capacity to anticipate the actions of others and coor-
30dinate instantaneously on an equilibrium action proﬁle. The vast ground between these two
extremes clearly merits serious exploration, through the explicit modeling of cognitive con-
straints (see Bednar and Page, 2001, and Samuelson, 2001, for recent steps in this direction).
It has recently been argued that even allowing for a richer set of preferences, the behavior of
experimental subjects commonly violates the hypothesis of sequential rationality (Binmore
et al., 1999). This suggests that modeling bounded rationality and/or directly letting evolu-
tion act on behavior may be more fruitful than modeling non-opportunistic utility functions
at least in some contexts.
Finally, future research within the preference-based approach would beneﬁtf r o mu s i n g
universal (context-free) speciﬁcations of preferences rather than the game-speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ
transformations that are currently prevalent. The main source of such speciﬁcations is
clearly the experimental literature, but evolutionary reasoning can help reﬁne and select
among various hypotheses. Experimental economists are seeking the most parsimonious
speciﬁcation that will ﬁt a wide variety of data, and evolutionary models can be used to
guide and discipline this search. This symbiotic evolution of experimental and theoretical
work is one of the most promising and exciting areas of future research on the nature and
origins of reciprocity.
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